Mapping metaethics (with Lance Bush)
1. Adopt Moral Quietism
Approach philosophical issues by identifying and resolving conceptual or linguistic confusions, allowing problems to dissolve rather than engaging in endless debate. This shifts focus to clearer understanding and more productive inquiry.
2. Focus on Practical Normative Questions
Shift philosophical attention from abstract meta-ethical debates about stance-independent moral facts to practical questions of how to negotiate differing values and design institutions that optimize collective interests. This leads to more relevant and actionable societal insights.
3. Engage in Interdisciplinary Study
Philosophers should actively engage with scientific fields like psychology, cosmology, and physics to gain insights that can curb biases, refine thinking, and inspire new approaches to philosophical issues. This broadens understanding and improves methodological rigor.
4. Prioritize Descriptive Moral Research
Conduct bottom-up descriptive research in moral psychology, utilizing anthropology and empirical linguistic approaches to gather extensive data on how people actually speak and think about morality. This provides a crucial empirical foundation for developing comprehensive theories.
5. Avoid the Typical Mind Fallacy
Be aware of the “typical mind fallacy,” which assumes others think exactly as you do, and recognize that psychological and cultural differences lead to wildly varying thought processes. This promotes more nuanced understanding and prevents incautious projections.
6. Resist Social Pressure in Philosophy
Maintain intellectual honesty and resist social pressure to conform to philosophical views or intuitions that are not genuinely held, even if it means being in the minority. This preserves independent thought and genuine inquiry.
7. Challenge Unexplained Primitive Concepts
When philosophers appeal to “primitive” or “unanalyzable” concepts (e.g., “ought,” “reason”) without explanation, challenge them to provide criteria for distinguishing legitimate primitive concepts from meaningless nonsense. This prevents arbitrary claims from being accepted without scrutiny.
8. Critically Evaluate Intuition’s Role
When intuitions are used to support philosophical conclusions, critically evaluate their evidentiary role, appropriate use, and what considerations might override them, rather than accepting them as infallible. This promotes rigorous philosophical methodology.
9. Avoid Armchair Philosophical Analysis
When analyzing moral claims, avoid relying solely on “armchair” philosophical reasoning without empirical study of how people actually use moral language in real-world contexts. This prevents decontextualizing moral statements and missing rich contributing factors.
10. Study Real-World Moral Language
Instead of analyzing hypothetical “toy” moral sentences, study how people actually use moral language in real-world contexts to understand their true meaning and intent. This provides rich contextual factors often missed in decontextualized analysis.
11. Challenge Presumptions on Lay Meaning
When philosophers claim to know what “ordinary people” mean by moral terms, question the empirical basis for these claims, as they often presume knowledge without conducting actual research. This encourages critical evaluation of philosophical arguments.
12. Clarify Metaethical Project Goals
Those engaged in metaethics should clearly define whether their project aims to describe psychological states, offer semantic accounts, or pursue other goals, especially when making claims about what ordinary people mean. This ensures transparency and appropriate methodological choices.
13. Limit Language-Reality Inference
Avoid the philosophical tendency to hyper-focus on language and assume that how people use terms directly reveals the fundamental nature of reality, as this can be premature and unmotivated. This encourages a more cautious approach to linguistic analysis.
14. Question Consensus from Faulty Methods
Do not automatically equate philosophical consensus with correctness, especially if the methods used to reach that consensus might be faulty or lead to non-independent conclusions. This encourages critical evaluation of collective agreement.
15. Avoid Normative Entanglement
Be aware of “normative entanglement,” a rhetorical strategy that embeds a meta-ethical question within a normative one (e.g., “Is torturing babies wrong?”), making it difficult to answer without implicitly conceding a meta-ethical stance or appearing morally callous. Avoid using or falling for this “trick question.”
16. Scrutinize “Common Sense” Claims
Be cautious when philosophers claim their abstract, complex positions are “common sense,” especially if those positions seem far removed from how ordinary people actually speak or think. This highlights a potential disconnect between philosophical theory and empirical reality.
17. Reject Uniformity of Moral Meaning
Do not assume that all people mean the same thing when making moral claims across all speakers and contexts, as this empirical claim is likely implausible. This encourages a more nuanced understanding of moral language.
18. Challenge Stipulative Definitions of Morality
When someone declares a “primary use” or specific subset of moral language as the “true” subject of morality, challenge how they determined this without empirical evidence of its prevalence. This avoids arbitrary or unmotivated definitions.
19. Avoid Imposing Hyper-Theoretical Views
Recognize that complex meta-ethical positions may be “hyper-theoretical impositions” by philosophers, not necessarily governing how ordinary people speak or think about morality. This promotes humility and empirical grounding in philosophical inquiry.
20. Question “Distinctively Moral” Cognition
Challenge the assumption that a capacity for “distinctively moral cognition” evolved or that there’s a principled distinction between moral and non-moral considerations, as this concept may be fuzzy or ill-defined. This encourages a broader view of normative judgments.
21. Recognize Cultural Moral Variability
Understand that the distinction between moral and non-moral concerns is not culturally universal, and different populations may categorize normative judgments differently. This fosters a more nuanced and less ethnocentric perspective.
22. Address Naturalism’s Triviality Objection
When considering moral naturalism, address the “triviality objection” by explaining why one should care about natural facts (e.g., promoting cooperation) if they are equated with moral facts, beyond mere description. This highlights a key challenge for naturalistic accounts.
23. Reduce Normative to Descriptive Claims
Attempt to reduce or eliminate normative claims (e.g., “should,” “reason”) to descriptive claims, arguing that there is no “irreducible normativity” left over. This provides a framework for analyzing moral language.
24. Question “Facts Provide Reasons”
Be skeptical of the notion that “facts provide reasons” for action independently of one’s goals, preferences, or values, as this framing can be conceptually strange and difficult to justify.
25. Apply Social Scientific Methods
Address traditional philosophical questions by using social scientific methods, such as surveys and thought experiments, presented to non-philosophers to understand their responses. This can help clarify metaphilosophical issues and proper methods.
26. Distinguish Universal Scope from Stance
When discussing moral principles, differentiate “universal” (who it applies to) from “stance-dependent/independent” (what makes it true), as these concepts are orthogonal. This helps avoid conceptual confusion in moral discussions.
27. Define “Free Will” Precisely
When discussing “free will,” get super specific about what is meant by the term (e.g., capacity to act consistently with goals vs. violating physics) to dissolve many long-standing philosophical disputes.
28. Define “Sound” Precisely
When asking if a falling tree makes a sound, clarify whether “sound” refers to perceived vibrations (no) or physical air vibrations (yes) to resolve the question.