Mapping metaethics (with Lance Bush)
Lance Bush discusses metaethics, exploring different perspectives on moral philosophy and problems with morality research. He critiques traditional armchair philosophy, advocating for empirical methods and conceptual clarity to dissolve philosophical confusions.
Deep Dive Analysis
18 Topic Outline
Defining Metaethics and Branches of Ethics
Moral Realism vs. Moral Anti-Realism
Moral Naturalism vs. Moral Non-Naturalism
Moral Relativism and its Complications
Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism in Moral Claims
Error Theory: All Moral Claims are False
The Problem with Analyzing Hypothetical Moral Sentences
Experimental Philosophy and its Impact
Introduction to Moral Quietism
Critique of Uniformity and Determinacy in Moral Claims
The Evolution of Moral Cognition
Critique of Moral Naturalism
Critique of Moral Non-Naturalism and Primitive Concepts
The Constructive Case for Moral Quietism
Quickfire: Normative Entanglement
Quickfire: Role of Intuitions in Philosophy
Quickfire: Philosophy's Current Problems and Interdisciplinary Needs
Quickfire: Reaction to PhilPaper Survey on Moral Realism
10 Key Concepts
Metaethics
Metaethics is a branch of ethics that explores abstract and fundamental questions about the nature of morality, such as whether moral truth exists, how we can know it, and what it means for something to be morally right or wrong. It doesn't deal with specific moral actions but rather the underlying concepts of morality itself.
Normative Ethics
Normative ethics is an intermediate branch of ethics focused on formulating principles or rules that should guide morally right and wrong action. It includes familiar theories like utilitarianism (consequences), deontology (rules), and virtue ethics (character), aiming to define what makes an action right or wrong.
Applied Ethics
Applied ethics is the most concrete branch of ethics, dealing with specific, real-world issues like the moral permissibility of euthanasia or abortion. It takes normative theories and applies them to particular cases, asking whether an action is right, wrong, permissible, or obligatory in that context.
Moral Realism
Moral realism is the view that there are stance-independent moral facts, meaning moral truths exist regardless of anyone's values, standards, preferences, or attitudes. These facts are not made true by the preferences or goals of individuals or groups.
Moral Anti-Realism
Moral anti-realism is the opposing view to moral realism, asserting that there are no stance-independent moral facts. It encompasses theories like relativism, error theory, and non-cognitivism, which offer different explanations for the nature of moral claims.
Moral Relativism
Moral relativism posits that moral claims are true or false relative to a particular stance, such as an individual's standards or a culture's norms. For example, 'murder is wrong' might mean 'murder is inconsistent with my moral standards,' making its truth value dependent on the speaker's perspective.
Error Theory
Error theory is the claim that all moral statements are systematically false. It suggests that moral claims attempt to refer to stance-independent moral facts, but since such facts do not exist, all statements presupposing their existence are therefore false, similar to how statements about unicorns are false if unicorns don't exist.
Non-Cognitivism
Non-cognitivism is the view that moral claims are not truth-apt, meaning they are not capable of being true or false. Instead of expressing propositions, they are understood as expressing emotions (emotivism, e.g., 'murder, boo!') or imperatives (e.g., 'don't murder'), rather than making claims about the world.
Moral Quietism
Moral quietism is a metaethical position suggesting that many philosophical issues, including those in metaethics, arise from conceptual or linguistic confusions. Once these confusions are clarified, the problems dissolve, leading to a 'quiet' resolution rather than a substantive answer, often by recognizing that terms like 'moral' or 'should' lack a clear, universal meaning.
Normative Entanglement
Normative entanglement is a rhetorical strategy where a normative question (e.g., 'Is torturing babies for fun wrong?') is asked in a way that implicitly embeds a metaethical question. An anti-realist's 'no' to the metaethical component can be misconstrued as a 'no' to the normative component, making them appear to condone the action.
10 Questions Answered
Metaethics addresses abstract questions about the nature of morality, normative ethics formulates principles for right and wrong action (e.g., utilitarianism), and applied ethics deals with specific moral issues in concrete cases (e.g., abortion).
While terminology can be slippery, in metaethics, 'objectivism' is often used to mean stance-independent, which aligns with the core idea of moral realism that moral facts exist independently of individual or group stances.
For a moral realist, what makes moral statements true depends on their specific sub-category. Moral naturalists believe moral facts are consistent with and explicable by science (e.g., what increases happiness), while moral non-naturalists believe moral facts are not reducible to natural facts and might be known through a priori reasoning, similar to mathematical truths.
Moral relativism explains moral truth by suggesting that moral claims contain an implicit indexical element, meaning their truth status varies depending on the speaker's or group's moral standards. For example, 'murder is wrong' could mean 'murder is inconsistent with my moral standards,' making it true for one person and false for another without contradiction.
The primary issue is that philosophers often analyze decontextualized, hypothetical moral sentences like 'murder is wrong' rather than actual moral claims made by real people in real-world situations. This approach removes rich contextual factors that contribute to what people actually mean and do when they make moral judgments, making their analysis potentially misaligned with human behavior.
Experimental philosophy, which uses social scientific methods to study philosophical questions, can help by drawing attention to metaphilosophical issues and questioning proper methods. However, its direct impact on mainstream philosophy's progress is debated, partly because its findings are not always integrated into traditional philosophical discourse.
Moral quietism rejects this notion because it finds the concept of stance-independent normative facts to be conceptually confused and ultimately unintelligible. Proponents of such facts often resort to describing them as 'primitive' or 'unanalyzable,' which moral quietism views as an unsatisfactory explanation that lacks a clear conceptual entry point.
The main problem with moral naturalism, often called the 'triviality objection,' is that if moral facts are merely a type of natural, descriptive fact (e.g., what promotes cooperation), it's unclear why anyone should care about them or be obligated to act in response to them. It seems to change the subject from normative 'shoulds' to descriptive 'ises.'
From a quietist perspective, the constructive path involves setting aside abstract metaethical questions and focusing on empirical, descriptive research into how people actually use moral language and make moral judgments in the real world. Philosophically, it means addressing practical questions about how to negotiate differences in values to devise norms and institutions that optimize collective interests.
Intuitions in philosophy are often used to support conclusions, sometimes serving an evidentiary role (e.g., phenomenal conservatism suggests an intuition provides prima facie justification). However, their precise role, when they are appropriate, and what can override them are matters of considerable dispute, with some critics arguing they can be arbitrarily strong and resistant to counter-arguments.
28 Actionable Insights
1. Adopt Moral Quietism
Approach philosophical issues by identifying and resolving conceptual or linguistic confusions, allowing problems to dissolve rather than engaging in endless debate. This shifts focus to clearer understanding and more productive inquiry.
2. Focus on Practical Normative Questions
Shift philosophical attention from abstract meta-ethical debates about stance-independent moral facts to practical questions of how to negotiate differing values and design institutions that optimize collective interests. This leads to more relevant and actionable societal insights.
3. Engage in Interdisciplinary Study
Philosophers should actively engage with scientific fields like psychology, cosmology, and physics to gain insights that can curb biases, refine thinking, and inspire new approaches to philosophical issues. This broadens understanding and improves methodological rigor.
4. Prioritize Descriptive Moral Research
Conduct bottom-up descriptive research in moral psychology, utilizing anthropology and empirical linguistic approaches to gather extensive data on how people actually speak and think about morality. This provides a crucial empirical foundation for developing comprehensive theories.
5. Avoid the Typical Mind Fallacy
Be aware of the “typical mind fallacy,” which assumes others think exactly as you do, and recognize that psychological and cultural differences lead to wildly varying thought processes. This promotes more nuanced understanding and prevents incautious projections.
6. Resist Social Pressure in Philosophy
Maintain intellectual honesty and resist social pressure to conform to philosophical views or intuitions that are not genuinely held, even if it means being in the minority. This preserves independent thought and genuine inquiry.
7. Challenge Unexplained Primitive Concepts
When philosophers appeal to “primitive” or “unanalyzable” concepts (e.g., “ought,” “reason”) without explanation, challenge them to provide criteria for distinguishing legitimate primitive concepts from meaningless nonsense. This prevents arbitrary claims from being accepted without scrutiny.
8. Critically Evaluate Intuition’s Role
When intuitions are used to support philosophical conclusions, critically evaluate their evidentiary role, appropriate use, and what considerations might override them, rather than accepting them as infallible. This promotes rigorous philosophical methodology.
9. Avoid Armchair Philosophical Analysis
When analyzing moral claims, avoid relying solely on “armchair” philosophical reasoning without empirical study of how people actually use moral language in real-world contexts. This prevents decontextualizing moral statements and missing rich contributing factors.
10. Study Real-World Moral Language
Instead of analyzing hypothetical “toy” moral sentences, study how people actually use moral language in real-world contexts to understand their true meaning and intent. This provides rich contextual factors often missed in decontextualized analysis.
11. Challenge Presumptions on Lay Meaning
When philosophers claim to know what “ordinary people” mean by moral terms, question the empirical basis for these claims, as they often presume knowledge without conducting actual research. This encourages critical evaluation of philosophical arguments.
12. Clarify Metaethical Project Goals
Those engaged in metaethics should clearly define whether their project aims to describe psychological states, offer semantic accounts, or pursue other goals, especially when making claims about what ordinary people mean. This ensures transparency and appropriate methodological choices.
13. Limit Language-Reality Inference
Avoid the philosophical tendency to hyper-focus on language and assume that how people use terms directly reveals the fundamental nature of reality, as this can be premature and unmotivated. This encourages a more cautious approach to linguistic analysis.
14. Question Consensus from Faulty Methods
Do not automatically equate philosophical consensus with correctness, especially if the methods used to reach that consensus might be faulty or lead to non-independent conclusions. This encourages critical evaluation of collective agreement.
15. Avoid Normative Entanglement
Be aware of “normative entanglement,” a rhetorical strategy that embeds a meta-ethical question within a normative one (e.g., “Is torturing babies wrong?”), making it difficult to answer without implicitly conceding a meta-ethical stance or appearing morally callous. Avoid using or falling for this “trick question.”
16. Scrutinize “Common Sense” Claims
Be cautious when philosophers claim their abstract, complex positions are “common sense,” especially if those positions seem far removed from how ordinary people actually speak or think. This highlights a potential disconnect between philosophical theory and empirical reality.
17. Reject Uniformity of Moral Meaning
Do not assume that all people mean the same thing when making moral claims across all speakers and contexts, as this empirical claim is likely implausible. This encourages a more nuanced understanding of moral language.
18. Challenge Stipulative Definitions of Morality
When someone declares a “primary use” or specific subset of moral language as the “true” subject of morality, challenge how they determined this without empirical evidence of its prevalence. This avoids arbitrary or unmotivated definitions.
19. Avoid Imposing Hyper-Theoretical Views
Recognize that complex meta-ethical positions may be “hyper-theoretical impositions” by philosophers, not necessarily governing how ordinary people speak or think about morality. This promotes humility and empirical grounding in philosophical inquiry.
20. Question “Distinctively Moral” Cognition
Challenge the assumption that a capacity for “distinctively moral cognition” evolved or that there’s a principled distinction between moral and non-moral considerations, as this concept may be fuzzy or ill-defined. This encourages a broader view of normative judgments.
21. Recognize Cultural Moral Variability
Understand that the distinction between moral and non-moral concerns is not culturally universal, and different populations may categorize normative judgments differently. This fosters a more nuanced and less ethnocentric perspective.
22. Address Naturalism’s Triviality Objection
When considering moral naturalism, address the “triviality objection” by explaining why one should care about natural facts (e.g., promoting cooperation) if they are equated with moral facts, beyond mere description. This highlights a key challenge for naturalistic accounts.
23. Reduce Normative to Descriptive Claims
Attempt to reduce or eliminate normative claims (e.g., “should,” “reason”) to descriptive claims, arguing that there is no “irreducible normativity” left over. This provides a framework for analyzing moral language.
24. Question “Facts Provide Reasons”
Be skeptical of the notion that “facts provide reasons” for action independently of one’s goals, preferences, or values, as this framing can be conceptually strange and difficult to justify.
25. Apply Social Scientific Methods
Address traditional philosophical questions by using social scientific methods, such as surveys and thought experiments, presented to non-philosophers to understand their responses. This can help clarify metaphilosophical issues and proper methods.
26. Distinguish Universal Scope from Stance
When discussing moral principles, differentiate “universal” (who it applies to) from “stance-dependent/independent” (what makes it true), as these concepts are orthogonal. This helps avoid conceptual confusion in moral discussions.
27. Define “Free Will” Precisely
When discussing “free will,” get super specific about what is meant by the term (e.g., capacity to act consistently with goals vs. violating physics) to dissolve many long-standing philosophical disputes.
28. Define “Sound” Precisely
When asking if a falling tree makes a sound, clarify whether “sound” refers to perceived vibrations (no) or physical air vibrations (yes) to resolve the question.
6 Key Quotes
Metaethics is a branch of ethics that deals with abstract and fundamental questions about the nature of morality. So questions about the sort of metaphysical and epistemological status of moral claims, of moral facts.
Lance Bush
So I see universality and stance dependence or independence as orthogonal to one another.
Lance Bush
So the error theory says basically the same thing about unicorns, but they just transpose that over to morality and they say, okay, well, when people are making moral claims, they're trying to say something that could be true or false, but they're implicitly committed to something that doesn't exist.
Lance Bush
I don't know if my view is unique, but it doesn't seem to be well-represented or explicitly represented in the philosophical literature at all, as far as I'm aware of.
Lance Bush
I think one of the biggest problems in philosophy is the hyper-focus on language and the tendency to think that we can read off of the way that people use terms what the fundamental nature of reality is.
Lance Bush
Philosophers can be highly subject to like this typical mind fallacy where they suppose that other people must think the way that they do.
Lance Bush