#117 - Stanley Perlman, M.D., Ph.D.: Insights from a coronavirus expert on COVID-19

Jun 29, 2020 Episode Page ↗
Overview

Dr. Stanley Perlman, Professor of Microbiology, Immunology, and Pediatrics, discusses coronaviruses, including SARS-CoV-1 and MERS. He compares them to SARS-CoV-2, exploring durable immunity, therapeutic strategies, and future pandemic preparedness.

At a Glance
12 Insights
1h 43m Duration
15 Topics
6 Concepts

Deep Dive Analysis

Stanley Perlman's Background and Entry into Virology

The Coronavirus Family: Definition, Structure, and Diversity

Evolutionary Purpose and Animal Hosts of Viruses

Understanding Endemic Human Coronaviruses Pre-SARS

The Emergence and Impact of the 2002-2003 SARS Outbreak

The 2012 MERS Outbreak: Origins, Transmission, and Lethality

Comparing SARS-CoV-2 to SARS-1 and MERS

Long-Term Health Impacts for COVID-19 Survivors

Pandemic Preparedness: Lessons from Past Outbreaks

Immune Response to Common Cold Coronaviruses

Herd Immunity Explained in the Context of SARS-CoV-2

Genetic Drift and Immune Evasion in Coronaviruses

Cross-Reactive T-Cell Responses from Other Coronaviruses

Therapeutic Strategies and Biomarkers for COVID-19

Durability of Immune Response and Vaccine Implications

Coronavirus Family

Coronaviruses are categorized by their appearance under an electron microscope, their replication strategy, and genetic relatedness. This family includes viruses that infect a wide range of species, from chickens and pigs to humans and bats, but they are very diverse in their specific hosts and disease outcomes.

R-naught (R0)

R-naught is a measure of a virus's transmissibility, indicating the average number of people a single infected individual will infect. A higher R-naught means a virus spreads more rapidly through a susceptible population, leading to exponential growth in cases.

Case Fatality Rate (CFR)

CFR refers to the proportion of confirmed cases of a disease that result in death. It can be misleading if the total number of infected individuals (including asymptomatic or mild cases) is unknown, as it only considers diagnosed cases rather than all infections.

Nosocomial Spread

This term refers to the spread of infection within a hospital or healthcare setting. Viruses like SARS and MERS, which often cause severe lung disease requiring hospitalization and invasive procedures, can have a significantly higher R-naught in such environments due to close contact and aerosol-generating treatments.

Herd Immunity

Herd immunity is achieved when a sufficient percentage of a population becomes immune to a disease, either through vaccination or prior infection, thereby protecting susceptible individuals by making it difficult for the virus to spread. The required threshold for herd immunity is directly related to the virus's R-naught.

Genetic Drift

Genetic drift refers to the accumulation of small mutations in a virus's genetic material over time, which can lead to changes in its surface proteins (antigens). This can make previously acquired immunity or existing vaccines less effective if the immune system no longer recognizes the altered virus.

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How did Stanley Perlman become involved in coronavirus research?

Stanley Perlman initially trained in cell biology, developmental biology, and virology, then went to medical school, becoming interested in pediatrics and infectious diseases. His research focused on how viruses interact with the brain, leading him to study coronaviruses in mice as a model for demyelination, similar to multiple sclerosis.

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Why are coronaviruses named 'coronaviruses'?

Coronaviruses are named for the crown-like or sun-like projections (corona) on their surface when viewed under an electron microscope. This distinctive appearance led early researchers to assign the name based on this visual characteristic.

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What was the R-naught (transmissibility) of the 2002-2003 SARS virus?

The R-naught for SARS was estimated to be about two to three, meaning one infected person would typically infect two to three others. However, this average was misleading, as spread occurred much more readily within hospitals, especially during procedures that aerosolized lung fluids.

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Why did the MERS virus not cause a widespread epidemic despite its high mortality rate?

MERS did not cause a widespread epidemic because its human-to-human R-naught was very low, estimated between 0.35 and 0.5 outside of hospitals. This poor ability to spread between people, even with a high case fatality rate, made it relatively easy to contain, with most transmission occurring in healthcare settings.

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Why was the 2002-2003 SARS outbreak eradicated?

The SARS outbreak was eradicated due to a combination of factors: there was no animal reservoir continuously reintroducing the virus to humans, and infected individuals were typically not contagious until they became symptomatic. This allowed for effective identification and quarantine of sick individuals, stopping the chain of transmission.

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How does SARS-CoV-2 differ from SARS-1 and MERS in terms of pathology and transmissibility?

SARS-CoV-2 is described as a mixture of a common cold coronavirus and SARS/MERS in the lungs, allowing it to infect both the upper airway and the lungs. This upper airway infection contributes to its high transmissibility, even from asymptomatic individuals, unlike SARS-1 and MERS which primarily caused deep lung disease and were less contagious until severe symptoms appeared.

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What are the potential long-term health consequences for COVID-19 survivors?

While not fully understood, survivors of severe COVID-19, like those from SARS and MERS, may experience lingering issues such as reduced lung function or cognitive dysfunction. These impacts could be due to permanent tissue damage, prolonged critical illness (e.g., ventilator use), or even immune-mediated neurological effects, even if the virus isn't directly found in the brain.

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Why do people get reinfected with common cold coronaviruses?

The exact reasons for reinfection with common cold coronaviruses are not fully understood, but it's known that the antibody response to these viruses wanes over time, often within a year. Specific antibodies like IgA also decline, and the role of T-cell responses in long-term immunity to these mild infections is not well-established.

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What is the current understanding of genetic drift in SARS-CoV-2?

So far, there is no strong evidence that SARS-CoV-2 is undergoing significant genetic drift that would make a vaccine ineffective or prevent protection from a previous infection. While some coronaviruses like OC43 show variation, SARS-CoV-2 has not yet demonstrated changes that would fundamentally alter its immune recognition.

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Could prior exposure to common cold coronaviruses offer some protection against SARS-CoV-2?

Some studies suggest that people who have never been exposed to SARS-CoV-2 may have a T-cell response to it, potentially due to cross-reactivity from common cold coronaviruses. However, these findings are preliminary, often based on activation markers rather than direct killing function, and the homology between the T-cell targets is not always clear, so the importance of this cross-reactivity is still under investigation.

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What is the ideal strategy for treating COVID-19 patients?

The ideal strategy for treating COVID-19 would involve a phased approach: antiviral therapy (like remdesivir or an oral form) early in the infection to stop viral replication, followed by immune modulators later in the disease course to address an overactive immune response. This approach requires better biomarkers to identify disease stages and tailor therapy effectively.

1. Invest in Pandemic Preparedness

Governments should invest in national stockpiles of PPE, electronic infrastructure for contact tracing, and reagents for rapid serologic and PCR testing as ’no regret moves’ to prepare for future pandemics. This allows for immediate, large-scale testing and mitigation efforts.

2. Stockpile Immune Modulating Drugs

Establish a large national stockpile of immune-modulating drugs, as many infectious diseases involve an overactive immune response, making this a crucial therapeutic preparedness measure. This strategy is more general than specific antivirals, which may be virus-specific.

3. Implement Phased Disease Treatment

Adopt a sophisticated, phased therapeutic strategy for infectious diseases: early treatment should focus on antivirals and immune amplifiers, while later stages, characterized by hyperactivated immune responses, should utilize immune modulators and respiratory support. This approach tailors treatment to disease progression.

4. Develop Biomarkers for Disease Stages

Invest in developing biomarkers to identify different stages of disease and predict progression, enabling personalized and modulated therapy. This is an ideal application for machine learning, combining biomarker data with epidemiological factors to guide treatment decisions.

5. Monitor Disease Progression with Serial Testing

Implement serial testing (e.g., every couple of days) to monitor patient markers and feed data into machine learning models. This approach could identify individuals at risk of severe disease, allowing for timely and targeted interventions like antivirals or immune activators.

6. Research Immunity Durability & Shedding

Prioritize research into the durability of immune responses to viruses, particularly how long immunity protects against severe disease versus preventing viral shedding and transmissibility. This knowledge is crucial for vaccine strategies and public health planning, as it impacts societal protection.

7. Conduct Human Challenge Studies

To understand immunity waning and transmissibility, conduct human challenge studies where volunteers are infected with a common cold coronavirus, and then reinfected later to measure cold symptoms and the extent of viral shedding. This helps determine if reduced shedding is sufficient to prevent spread.

8. Plan for Viral Coexistence

Recognize that some viruses, like SARS-CoV-2, may never be eradicated, necessitating a societal shift in mindset and planning towards long-term coexistence rather than elimination. This involves understanding how to manage the virus if it becomes a common cold.

9. Evaluate Vaccine Risk-Benefit

Thoroughly evaluate the risk-benefit profile of vaccines, especially for new viruses, considering that some vaccines (e.g., RSV) are harder to develop safely. This requires a careful cost-benefit analysis before widespread implementation, as risks can vary.

10. Address Vaccine Acceptance

Public health strategies must proactively address and understand public willingness to be vaccinated, as vaccine acceptance is a critical factor in achieving widespread immunity. This is an important consideration for the success of any vaccination campaign.

11. Deepen Immune System Knowledge

To truly understand viruses and their impact, educate yourself thoroughly on the immune system, including innate, adaptive, humoral (B cells, antibodies), and cellular (T cells) components. This foundational knowledge is essential for comprehending viral dynamics.

12. Prioritize Immunology Podcast

Listen to the David Watkins podcast before this one to get a foundational understanding of immunology, which will help in understanding the coronavirus discussion. This sequential listening provides necessary context for complex topics.

Everybody is an armchair coronavirus expert now, but you actually want to talk to the guy who was studying coronaviruses before they were sexy. And that's Stanley.

Peter Attia

The genetic information of a coronavirus is about four times that of the polio virus. And yet the virus doesn't seem to do that much more than polio virus.

Stanley Perlman

If you take the transmissibility of that, which is both, and primarily is a factor of the fact that it can spread before you're symptomatic, coupled with the actual pathology of MERS, which I want to contrast with these viruses, I mean, that's a double whammy. You can really get into a dangerous situation.

Peter Attia

I think about this as SARS-CoV-2 being a mixture of the common cold coronavirus and then a mix of plus either SARS or MERS coronavirus in the lungs. So that's why you have the transmissibility and the severe disease because it does both.

Stanley Perlman

The doomsday scenario would be a virus that retains its virulence, but constantly drifts enough genetically that your immune system never recognizes it again, but it retains all of its bad properties. I mean, that's a disaster.

Peter Attia
6 years
Duration of medical school and fellowship (Stanley Perlman) From starting medical school to finishing fellowship, due to a truncated program for PhD holders.
22 months
Duration of truncated medical school training for PhDs (Stanley Perlman) At a specific program in Miami during a doctor shortage.
4 times
Genetic information size of coronavirus compared to poliovirus Coronaviruses have a much larger amount of RNA.
15
Number of human genes equivalent to coronavirus genetic material length Approximate, if human genes were laid side by side in terms of length.
Approximately 25
Number of different proteins coded by SARS-CoV-2 Varying in size, many are small.
1930s-1940s
First identification of coronavirus in chickens Infectious bronchitis virus.
1960s
First identification of human common cold coronaviruses Isolated from people with colds, having similar structure to chicken/pig coronaviruses.
2
Endemic human coronaviruses known in mid-1990s 229E and OC43; two others discovered after SARS in 2004.
End of 2002
Start of SARS outbreak Became a big deal in 2003, eliminated by July 2003.
2 to 3
SARS-CoV-1 R-naught Average, but much higher in hospital settings.
10%
SARS-CoV-1 mortality rate Case fatality rate, potentially lower if asymptomatic cases were included.
Up to a third
Percentage of animal handlers with antibodies to SARS-CoV-1 At the live animal market in Guangzhou where SARS-CoV-1 likely originated.
8,000
Total confirmed SARS-CoV-1 cases worldwide Around the world, making containment feasible through identification and quarantine.
2012
First identification of MERS in people Though the virus was likely in camels since at least 1983.
35%
MERS mortality rate Billed mortality rate, based on confirmed cases.
0.35 to 0.5
MERS R-naught outside of hospitals Low range, making human-to-human spread unlikely.
Almost 900
Approximate number of MERS deaths Out of approximately 2,500 confirmed cases.
Around 15
Measles R-naught One of the highest R-naughts for a virus.
95%
Herd immunity threshold for measles Required percentage of immune individuals to protect the susceptible.
60% to 70%
Herd immunity threshold for most common viruses (including SARS-CoV-2) Required percentage of immune individuals to protect the susceptible.
Closer to 100 million
Estimated number of people infected worldwide with SARS-CoV-2 (Peter Attia's personal estimate) A gross underestimate of the official 10 million confirmed cases.